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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
THROUGH CRIMINAL PROSECUTION*

STEVEN PURO**

ABSTRACT
Federal criminal prosecution of law enforcement officers’ violations of
individuals’ civil rights is a traditional way to remedy law enforcement
misconduct. The U.S. Department of Justice has significant interactions with
state and local officials in these processes. There was increased emphasis on
U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section law
enforcement criminal prosecutions in the last five years of the period from
fiscal year 1985 to fiscal year 2001. Patterns of Criminal Section behavior are
observed during this seventeen-year period and the most recent five years.
This article demonstrates structural and legal problems faced by federal
prosecutors bringing suit against law enforcement officials under 18 U.S.C. §§
241 and 242.
I. INTRODUCTION
Intergovernmental relations between the United States and state
governments concerning police accountability are central to enacting effective
societal control over police conduct. These relationships reflect dynamic
interactions between the federal and state governments. Control of police has
been a local and state function, and the control of police accountability has not
been nation-centered. Federal, state and local governments’ activities overlap
to control police accountability. This article will uncover United States
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section (hereinafter
referred to as “Criminal Section”) prosecutorial patterns for law enforcement
misconduct during the seventeen years between fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year
2001. The utility of these prosecutions and Federal Bureau of Investigation

* This paper is a substantially revised version of my presentation at the symposium entitled Law
Enforcement: New Approaches to Insuring Police Accountability at the St. Louis University
School of Law on April 5, 2002. I would like to especially thank Roger Goldman for extensive
discussion of these issues. I also thank Matt Piant, Margaret McDermott, Laura Schulz and Matt
Waltz for their assistance in preparation of this article.
** Steven Puro, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Saint Louis University.
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(FBI) investigations to attain law enforcement accountability will be analyzed.
In an article in this journal, Roger Goldman proposes interactions between the
United States Department of Justice, the FBI, and state and local governmental
officials that could enhance law enforcement accountability in the United
States.
Inter-connectedness among levels of government focuses analysis upon the
power distribution within particular intergovernmental relationships. Joel
Handler argues that federalism is the allocation and reallocation of authority
between the states and the federal government.1 The federal government has
authority to control law enforcement misconduct through prosecutions mainly
by the Criminal Section and the United States Attorneys. Both the Criminal
Section and U.S. Attorneys can prosecute law enforcement cases on their own.
Cooperative efforts between them vary on an annual basis in fiscal years 1985
to 2001. In this period, the percentage of cases where U.S. Attorneys
participated in Criminal Section prosecutions ranged from eight percent to
sixty-three percent of cases in a year.2
This article will focus upon processes and patterns of Criminal Section
prosecutions of law enforcement officials’ criminal conduct that violates
individuals’ civil rights. The time period from fiscal year 1985 to fiscal year
2001 is examined for main trends, and there is additional emphasis on the most
recent five years. The article examines institutional, structural and legal
problems faced by federal prosecutors bringing suit against law enforcement
officials under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. Interaction between the U.S.
Department of Justice, its Criminal Section, and other federal and state
officials during fiscal years 1985 to 2001 will also be discussed.
II. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, CRIMINAL SECTION
PROSECUTION OF POLICE MISCONDUCT
Citizens of a democracy should expect their police not only to enforce the law,
but to respect it.3

1. JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION
63 (1996).
2. CRIMINAL SECTION, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF
CRIMINAL SECTION ACTIVITIES (FY1985 - FY2001) (n.d.) [hereinafter SUMMARY], included in a
facsimile from Albert N. Moskowitz, Chief, Criminal Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to Roger Goldman, Professor of Law, Saint Louis University (Mar. 4, 2002) (on file
with author). See Table 1.
3. Christopher E. Stone, Introduction to ALEXIS AGATHOCLEOUS, VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, PROSECUTING POLICE MISCONDUCT: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF U.S. CIVIL
RIGHTS 3 (1998).
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Federal criminal prosecution of law enforcement officials for civil rights
and constitutional violations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 is a traditional
remedy for law enforcement misconduct.4 The Criminal Section can receive
complaints and engage in prosecutorial activities against local, state, and
federal law enforcement officials who abuse their power and violate the civil
rights of civilians.5 Prosecutions have been brought against police officers,
deputy sheriffs, state and federal correctional officers, state constables, and
federal immigration officials.6
The U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division has the major
responsibility in the federal government for the enforcement and prosecution
of federal civil rights law based upon federal statutes and additional authority
granted by the Attorney General.7 In addition, the Division, in cooperation
with the FBI, investigates and prosecutes hate crimes, discrimination in fair
housing and fair practices in employment, and enforcement of the Americans
with Disabilities Act.8 Some particular sections within the Division have
specialized activities. The Criminal Section’s broad responsibility includes
enforcement of criminal civil rights statutes concerning interference with
federally protected activities,9 conspiracy to injure citizens in the exercise of
federal rights,10 interference with fair housing activities,11 and willful
deprivation of federal rights under color of law.12 The Special Litigation
Section’s main civil enforcement responsibilities are for the Freedom of

4. This article will focus upon 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 & 242 (2000). Federal officers can also be
prosecuted under the provisions governing search warrants and warrantless searches in18 U.S.C.
§§ 2234-2236 (2000).
5. See generally Oversight Hearing on the Civil Rights Div. Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. of the House Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Bill Lann Lee, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice), 2000
WL 1115447 (F.D.C.H.) ; CRIMINAL SECTION, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
OVERVIEW, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002). Police
misconduct that has brought prosecution includes police brutality against citizens, use of force to
extract information and coerced confessions, illegal stops of motorists and pedestrians, and racial
profiling of select individuals for investigation and detention.
6. See generally Oversight Hearing on the Civil Rights Div. Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. of the House Judiciary Comm., supra note 5; CRIMINAL SECTION, supra note 5.
7. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/activity.html (last visited Feb. 2003).
8. Id.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (2000).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000). The Criminal Section also has authority under 18 U.S.C. § 247
(2000) (damage to religious property), 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000) (Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances) and 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2000) (involuntary servitude). See generally CRIMINAL
SECTION, supra note 5.
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Access to Clinic Entrances Act, and for the prevention of patterns or practices
of departmental police misconduct under 42 U.S.C. § 14141.13 In any given
fiscal year, the Assistant Attorney General emphasizes certain programs within
the Division. For example, in 1998 U.S. House Judiciary Committee
testimony, Bill Lann Lee said: “I plan to focus on three priorities: fighting hate
crimes, battling housing and lending discrimination, and attacking
discrimination against persons with disabilities.”14
Federal prosecution of criminal civil rights violations is necessary to allow
the national government to supervise federal, state, and local law enforcement
officials. James P. Turner, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Civil
Rights Division from 1969 to 1993, argues:
[T]he federal government program has addressed significant violations of
norms of law enforcement conduct, see, e.g., the Rodney King case where the
federal government prosecuted law enforcement officers after a failed state
prosecution, established legal benchmarks for law enforcement conduct and
encouraged state authorities to meet their primary responsibilities under the
federal system.15

The main avenue for the Criminal Section is individual complaints against law
enforcement officers for using their positions to deprive individuals of
constitutional rights, such as the right to be free from unwarranted assaults,
illegal arrests and searches, and the right to be free from deprivation of
property without due process of law.16 Meritorious complaints advance to the

13. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/index.html.
14. Oversight of Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 4-5
[hereinafter Oversight of Civil Rights Division] (statement of Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice).
15. See ALEXIS AGATHOCLEOUS, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING POLICE
MISCONDUCT: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS 13 (1998).
16. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/activity.html (Aug. 2002). The Criminal Section’s path from complaint
to trial is described in CRIMINAL SECTION, supra note 5. It describes the complaint and
investigation as follows:
Each complaint received is analyzed to decide whether an investigation is appropriate. If
an investigation is recommended, the FBI (the primary investigative agency) conducts the
investigation by interviewing witnesses and collecting evidence and sends its report both
to the responsible attorney within the Section, as well as to the U.S. Attorney’s Office
with responsibilities for federal prosecution within the geographic area where the incident
occurred. When the investigation is completed, the prosecutors must then decide whether
there is sufficient evidence to prove a federal violation and legal authority to pursue the
case in federal court.).
Id.
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level of an FBI investigation. If sufficient evidence is developed, then a grand
jury indictment and criminal prosecution may be brought.
In general, in the seventeen years between fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year
2001, the Criminal Section received 10,000 to 12,000 law enforcement and
non-law enforcement complaints annually, of which about 3000 advanced to
FBI investigations.17 As a result of these investigations, annually about 60
grand jury presentations were authorized, and about 60% of those presentations
resulted in charges being filed.18 One-half or more of the new grand juries
convened annually relate to law enforcement matters.19 In the process of
obtaining these prosecutions, the U.S. Department of Justice coordinates
activities with local U.S. Attorneys and FBI agents to enforce civil rights law
and enhance litigation of police misconduct and other criminal cases. Local
U.S. Attorneys have knowledge about their community, which can be a source
of new litigation, and they maintain relationships with local and state police
agencies. The Criminal Section has trial experience and knowledge of the
national dimension of federal prosecutions.20
The Criminal Section and the FBI coordinate the processing of complaints
and the conducting of investigations for purposes of bringing prosecutions.
The FBI does not undertake an investigation of a complaint without
authorization from the Criminal Section. When complaints are received by the
FBI field officers or FBI headquarters, they are forwarded to the Criminal
Section. The Criminal Section authorizes a preliminary investigation only
after it determines that there is a colorable case. The results of the preliminary
investigation are reported to FBI headquarters,21 then forwarded to the
Criminal Section, which decides whether to bring it to a grand jury. The
Criminal Section’s main criterion is whether they can prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused officer intentionally violated the defendant’s
civil rights. The Criminal Section may instruct that a further investigation be

17. SUMMARY, supra note 2. The data contained in the SUMMARY is reproduced in Table 1
within this article. With respect to complaints generally, they can occur in a variety of forms:
citizen correspondence, phone calls, or personal visits to the headquarters of the Department of
Justice, to the local U.S. Attorney’s Office, or to the FBI and their offices. CRIMINAL SECTION,
supra note 5.
18. SUMMARY, supra note 2. Federal grand juries can bring indictments for felonies and
misdemeanors. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000) (requiring that evidence be presented to a grand jury
in felony cases); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000) (allowing misdemeanor indictments to be brought).
19. SUMMARY, supra note 2.
20. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL §§ 8-3.100 - 8-3.130 (1998)
[hereinafter USAM] (illustrating further elements of coordination of activities between the Civil
Rights Division and United States Attorneys’ Offices).
21. See id. at § 8-3.110.
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conducted. The U.S. Attorneys may decline cases that arise in their office by
orally advising the FBI about that decision.22
This study will analyze the Criminal Section’s activities from fiscal year
1985 to fiscal year 2001 to determine the scope of those prosecutorial activities
concerning law enforcement officers. Data will demonstrate that the Criminal
Section adopts a careful prosecution program centering upon a limited number
of grand juries and trials.23 The difficulty of obtaining successful law
enforcement prosecution and other patterns of Criminal Section activities will
be examined. The data will show substantially greater success in the
percentage of Criminal Section prosecutions in non-law enforcement cases
than law enforcement cases. This information and analysis can suggest new
paths for state and federal authorities to address societal issues of law
enforcement misconduct.
III. CRIMINAL SECTION PROSECUTION STRATEGIES CONCERNING POLICE
MISCONDUCT
The Criminal Section prosecution strategies involve interactions between
the federal government and the states. States are key actors in bringing lawsuits
against law enforcement officials. Turner indicates the established Department
of Justice policy is to require that efforts be made to encourage state officials
to take appropriate action under state law and not act as national overseers of
routine police measures.24 The U.S. Attorney’s Manual shows that federal
policy dictates that federal prosecutors suspend their federal civil rights
prosecutions if local charges are filed.25 Also, the government often refrains
from actively investigating a viable case unless the state declines prosecution,
and by that time evidence and witnesses may be lost.26
The Department mainly considers serious violations that have not been
adequately redressed by state authorities, either because there was no
prosecution, no conviction, or because the conviction resulted in a plainly
inadequate sentence.27 This idea is developed further in the Civil Rights
Division Activities and Programs website which argues:
Because almost any matter which presents a violation of federal law is also a
matter involving a local or state law violation, deference is given to local
22. See id. at § 8-3.150 (concerning declinations of enforcement of civil rights statutes).
23. Cf. AGATHOCLEOUS, supra note 15, at 15 (“[T]he Division . . . chooses when and where
Washington should intervene and prosecute police misconduct.”).
24. See James P. Turner, Police Accountability in the Federal System, 30 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 991, 993, 1007 (1999).
25. See USAM, supra note 20, at § 9-2.031.
26. See Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just Sentencing
for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 720-21 (1996).
27. See Turner, supra note 24, at 993.
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prosecutions. But where there is no local action or where the results of the
state or local proceedings are insufficient to vindicate federal interests, a
federal prosecution may be brought.28

In fact, an official U.S. Department of Justice publication says: “[O]ften, local
authorities will take the lead in prosecuting violent conduct under state
statutes, even though such conduct also constitutes a violation of federal civil
rights law. In such cases, the Department of Justice presumes state prosecutors
to vindicate federal interests.”29 Christopher Stone, Director of Vera Institute,
reinforces this analysis by stating: “The Civil Rights Division is not the most
direct mechanism of police oversight in the nation, nor is it the primary
mechanism on which the people of any single jurisdiction rely. . . .”30
Recognition must be given to the fact that the federal government lacks
adequate resources because they have a small number of prosecutors in the
Criminal Section. In 1996, this Section had approximately thirty attorneys
whose caseloads were divided among all federal civil rights crimes.31 More
specific information showed that in 1998, there were only thirty-two full-time
attorneys who worked on police misconduct cases in the Criminal Section.32
Standards for FBI investigations also give priority to state and local
prosecutions when state or local criminal charges are filed against the
subject(s) of an investigation. In these instances, the FBI’s policy calls for the
investigation to be suspended.33 In investigations of law enforcement officers’
criminal violations of individuals’ civil rights, FBI officers face conflicting
demands between U.S. Department of Justice policies and the FBI’s close
working relationships with local and state police officers and prosecutors. For
example, when state and local prosecutors subpoena FBI agents to testify, the
FBI will resist compliance with the subpoena from their investigations in state,
local, or federal proceedings where the United States is not a party unless the
FBI agent personally observed the behavior.34 Instructions in the United States
Attorneys’ Manual concerning enforcement of civil rights statutes state: “In
such cases, where state and local authorities undertake vigorous prosecution in

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 16.
See CRIMINAL SECTION, supra note 5.
See Stone, supra note 3, at 3.
Freeman, supra note 26, at 721.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 95 (1998).
33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS RESOURCE MANUAL sec. 47 (Oct. 1997).
Subsection B provides conditions for exceptions to this procedure. Id.
34. USAM, supra note 20, at § 8-3.180; see also 28 C.F.R § 16.22 (West, WESTLAW
through Oct. 1, 2002).
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state courts, it is Department policy to cooperate fully with the local
prosecutor.”35
Relationships between local U.S. Attorneys and the U.S. Department of
Justice have limited federal prosecutorial activity. Prior to the late 1990s,
before U.S. Attorneys began an investigation or prosecution, they had to
submit cases concerning law enforcement officers’ criminal violations of
individuals’ civil rights to Department of Justice headquarters. Moreover, prior
to 1990 the norm was for the Civil Rights Division to prosecute cases through
the national office. This practice often restricted the number of cases based
upon national office capabilities, and often delayed prosecution of other
cases.36 By the mid-1990s this practice changed. In 1998, Bill Lann Lee, then
Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, stated that the norm at that
time was for the Civil Rights Division to prosecute police misconduct cases
jointly with local U.S. Attorneys’ offices.37
The numbers in Table 2 (below) are indicative of that change in behavior,
showing a significant increase in the number of law enforcement defendants
from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal years 1997 and 1998. There was a doubling of
these defendants between fiscal year 1996 (33 defendants) and fiscal year 1997
(67 defendants); and that level was maintained in fiscal year 1998 (74
defendants).
Successful federal criminal prosecution against individual officers is
difficult to accomplish. Major difficulties for prosecutorial success are:
standards of proof, juries’ willingness to believe the police and the justification
for their activities, and, as noted earlier, Department of Justice relationships
with the FBI and state and local police departments. From 1957 to 1994, the
Criminal Section’s dominant and almost exclusive avenue against police
brutality and violations of citizens was a criminal prosecution against
individual officers under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. A civil component for
legal action was added through the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act, especially with its pattern-or-practice section, to take action
against entire police departments.38 Since 1995, criminal prosecution under §§
241 and 242 remains a significant element of the Division’s activities.

35. USAM, supra note 20, at §§ 8-3.170 & 8-3.180; see also C.F.R §§ 16.22 & 16.26(c)
(West, WESTLAW 2002). The FBI will not provide information from their investigations in
state and local proceedings or federal proceedings where the United States is not a party, unless
the FBI agent personally observed the behavior. USAM, supra note 20, at §§ 8-3.170 & 8-3.180.
36. Oversight of Civil Rights Division, supra note 14.
37. AGATHOCLEOUS, supra note 15, at 15.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (West, WESTLAW 2002).
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John Jacobi indicates difficulties for federal prosecution of police
misconduct cases.39 In order to bring a case under § 242, the prosecutor must
provide evidence to prove the officer’s specific intent. The “specific intent”
has often translated into proving that the officer had the specific purpose of
depriving an individual of a constitutional right. He quotes Paul Chevigny:
To get a conviction, the [federal] prosecution must prove “specific intent” on
the part of the local official to violate a federal right, as distinct, for example,
from intent simply to assault the victim. . . . The usual difficulties in
prosecuting police in any system, combined with the high standard of intent
and the deference to local prosecutors, mean that federal criminal law
contributes little to the accountability of local police for acts of violence.40

Heads of the Criminal Section and veteran Criminal Section attorneys
regularly explain the low rate of prosecution by indicating that law
enforcement misconduct cases are difficult to bring to trial, and convincing
jurors to convict is difficult.41
Prosecutors at all government levels often lack the willingness and
resources to screen complaints of law enforcement misconduct. In a report by
Human Rights Watch, it is suggested that when asked to prosecute an officer,
prosecutors face an impossible conflict of interest between their desire to
maintain working relationships and their duty to investigate and prosecute
police brutality.42 The number of complaints against police officers in a large
urban area makes its difficult to prosecute in any but the most egregious
cases.43 Other reasons contributing to the low number of law enforcement
prosecutions include the fact that prosecutors must rely on officers who may
have divided loyalties.44 Fellow officers are reluctant to vigorously pursue
investigations of other officers’ misconduct; many officers follow a code of
silence that frustrates the investigation. Often police refuse to cooperate or
testify against fellow officers. Many times there are no witnesses other than
the victim, and then it becomes a credibility issue between a police officer and
the victim. Victims usually have a criminal record or were committing a crime
when the civil rights violation occurred. Also, many times the victims were

39. John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Conduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 809 (2000); see
also Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal Role in
Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1503 (1993).
40. Jacobi, supra note 39, at 810 (quoting PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE
VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS 107-08 (1995)).
41. AGATHOCLEOUS, supra note 15 passim.
42. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 32, at 86.
43. Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The
Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509, 537 (1994).
44. Id. at 536-37.
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drunk or using drugs at the time or have a history of such use. Meanwhile,
police officers have inherent credibility by virtue of their position.45
Patterns of difficulties of federal prosecution of law enforcement officers
are found in Criminal Section activities from fiscal years 1984 to 1995. In
these data, reported directly by the Criminal Section for the time period
overlapping this study’s analysis, the Criminal Section reports a higher success
rate for its general civil rights docket46—for example, cases involving matters
such as racial violence and housing interference—than its rate of success in
law enforcement misconduct cases which include police brutality.47 Studies
have repeatedly shown that it is more difficult to convict a police officer than
any other defendant.48 Overall, in these eleven years the Criminal Section had
a 71% success rate in prosecuting law enforcement officers charged with civil
rights violations.49 By contrast there was a greater than 95% success rate for
prosecuting non-law enforcement individuals charged with civil rights
violations.50 The latter high success rate results from the small number of
acquittals in the non-law enforcement category.
In fiscal year 2001, the Criminal Section was successful in 100% of its
non-law enforcement prosecutions and had an 80% success rate concerning
law enforcement officials, and the combined overall success rate was 89%.
Within the Criminal Section the success rate is based upon pleas plus
convictions divided by the total number of pleas, convictions, and acquittals.
A plea bargain is defined as a successful outcome; and the number of the
Criminal Section’s plea bargains and its success rates are given in Table 1,
below. In contrast, there is the Section’s conviction rate, calculated as the
number of convictions divided by the number of convictions and acquittals. In
45. Freeman, supra note 26, at 724-25 (citing Police Brutality: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.
120 (1991) (testimony of James Fyfe)).
46. Id. at 726 (citing an earlier edition of SUMMARY, supra note 2).
47. Id. at 723 (citing an earlier edition of SUMMARY, supra note 2). Success is defined as an
outcome of guilty, whether by conviction or plea. The success rate, expressed as a percentage, is
the ratio of convictions and pleas over the total number of cases filed. For five years the Criminal
Section’s success rate for all cases was higher than its rate of success specifically in lawenforcement cases: 94.4% overall versus 77.8% in law enforcement cases in 1990, 89.3% versus
80.6% (1991), 85% versus 62.2% (1992), 73.6% versus 58.7% (1993) and 92.2% versus 78.7%
(1994). See Table 1.
48. Levenson, supra note 43, at 541 (citing CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
INTERNAL REPORT (1993), as showing that the conviction rate for civil rights prosecutions against
police officers is consistently less than any other type of civil rights prosecution).
49. Id. at 541 (citing an earlier edition of SUMMARY, supra note 2, as showing that in the ten
years from 1982-1992 the conviction rate from trials, as opposed to guilty pleas, is much less, at
approximately 30%).
50. Id.; see also Paul Lieberman, King Case Prosecutors Must Scale Hurdles of History,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1998, at A1.
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that same year, 2001, the Section’s conviction rate for law enforcement
officials was 52%.51
IV. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: CRIMINAL SECTION ACTIVITIES DURING
FISCAL YEARS 1985-2001
The current study uncovers patterns of the Criminal Section’s prosecutorial
activities between fiscal years 1985 and 2001.52 Trends in its attempt to
achieve accountability among law enforcement officers will be analyzed.
There was substantial difficulty in obtaining specific elements of the Criminal
Section data. While much of the information contains the number of law
enforcement officials and non-law enforcement individuals, neither the number
of complaints filed nor the number of FBI investigations is separated for law
enforcement officials and non-law enforcement individuals in any fiscal year.
For example, between fiscal years 1997 and 2001, the Criminal Section
received 60,057 complaints and requested and reviewed about 15,863 FBI
investigations. Data in Table 1 does not provide information about the
allocation of these complaints and investigations between law enforcement
officials and non-law enforcement individuals. Missing or incomplete data
were found in other areas. For example, U.S. Congressional testimony
permitted only estimates of the number of police brutality/police misconduct
investigations. This article’s analysis of a seventeen-year time period of the
Criminal Section activities clarifies its behavior concerning law enforcement
officials. The analysis will proceed by first examining Criminal Section
activities in fiscal year 2001 to help readers interpret the data, then providing
an overview of the seventeen-year time period and a focus upon the most
recent five-year time period.

51. SUMMARY, supra note 2.
52. The analysis presented herein is based on data compiled by the Criminal Section, itself,
summarizing its investigative and prosecutorial activities. SUMMARY, supra note 2. The data is
reproduced in this article in Table 1. All of the data discussed in this section of the article (§ IV)
for which a source is not otherwise provided comes from the SUMMARY either directly or
derivatively.
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TABLE 153
SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL SECTION ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEARS
1985-2001
Fiscal Year

1985
Total

Complaints
FBI
Investigations
New Grand
Juries
Indictments
Informations
Cases Filed
U.S. Att’y
Participation
(% of cases
filed)
Defendants
Trials
Convictions
Pleas
Acquittals
Success Rate
(%)

1986
LE

Total

1987
LE

Total

9044

7546

7348

2970

2792

2826

56
35
10
45

40

30

49
35
14
49

38
106
30
41
36
21
77.8

34

LE

35

57
40
18
58

67
20
29
19
15

63
112
34
55
41
20

70
24
30
16
17

20
105
24
17
36
17

74
20
10
24
13

75

82

72

75.7

72.3

53. The data in this table has been reproduced from SUMMARY, supra note 2.
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Fiscal Year

1988
Total

Complaints
FBI
Investigations
New Grand
Juries
Indictments
Informations
Cases Filed
U.S. Att’y
Participation
(% of cases
filed)
Defendants
Trials
Convictions
Pleas
Acquittals
Success Rate
(%)

1989
LE

Total

1990
LE

Total

7603

8053

7960

2898

3177

3050

44
35
8
43

29

29

40
26
34
60

31
71
30
21
50
26

49
20
11
34
22

70.3

64.3

25

LE

18

47
30
36
66

25

8
85
23
23
68
10

22
21
20
13
10

14
101
14
17
51
3

37
8
5
9
3

87.5

73

94.4

77.8

23
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Fiscal Year

1991
Total

Complaints
FBI
Investigations
New Grand
Juries
Indictments
Informations
Cases Filed
U.S. Att’y
Participation
(% of cases
filed)
Defendants
Trials
Convictions
Pleas
Acquittals
Success Rate
(%)

1992
LE

Total

1993
LE

Total

9835

8599

9620

3583

3212

3026

LE

63
44
25
69

41
26
10
36

74
38
26
64

46
21
6
27

51
34
25
59

30
18
10
28

31
137
26
36
73
13

67
16
26
24
12

38
112
18
16
80
17

59
12
6
22
17

27
97
30
36
45
29

50
18
16
21
26

89.3

80.6

85

62.2

73.6

58.7
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Fiscal Year

1994
Total

Complaints
FBI
Investigations
New Grand
Juries
Indictments
Informations
Cases Filed
U.S. Att’y
Participation
(% of cases
filed)
Defendants
Trials
Convictions
Pleas
Acquittals
Success Rate
(%)

1995
LE

Total

1996
LE

Total

8342

8864

11721

2633

2370

2619

LE

64
40
36
76

34
18
16
34

68
46
37
83

38
17
10
27

70
50
29
79

37
18
4
22

29
139
23
22
81
11

46
15
12
25
10

30
138
24
32
75
13

50
7
6
23
8

23
128
22
22
85
14

33
12
10
19
14

90.4

78.7

89.2

78.4

86.9

64.4
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Fiscal Year

1997
Total

Complaints
FBI
Investigations
New Grand
Juries
Indictments
Informations
Cases Filed
U.S. Att’y
Participation
(% of cases
filed)
Defendants
Trials
Convictions
Pleas
Acquittals
Success Rate
(%)

1998
LE

Total

1999
LE

Total

10891

12192

12132

3321

3802

3664

LE

68
54
23
77

31
20
5
25

78
58
21
79

37
31
8
39

72
58
31
89

36
30
6
36

29
189
19
36
81
6

67
10
9
19
4

29
153
27
38
128
8

74
14
14
34
5

38
138
33
26
72
23

58
18
11
20
20

95.1

87.5

94.8

88.6

80.9

60.8
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Fiscal Year

2000
Total

Complaints
FBI
Investigations
New Grand
Juries
Indictments
Informations
Cases Filed
U.S. Att’y
Participation
(% of cases
filed)
Defendants
Trials
Convictions
Pleas
Acquittals
Success Rate
(%)

LE

2001
Total

12404

12438

2835

2241

LE

76
55
29
84

48
28
12
40

65
52
42
93

40
32
17
49

19
122
37
34
78
16

66
28
25
29
16

29
191
21
18
101
13

97
16
14
42
13

87.4

77.1

89.4

80

An initial understanding of the data can be accomplished by examining
activities in fiscal year 2001, the most recent data available. The Criminal
Section’s Summary gives the total number of complaints for all cases within its
jurisdiction (12,348 in fiscal year 2001, the highest number of complaints in
any fiscal year during this period) and FBI investigations (2241 in fiscal year
2001), but both of those totals include claims against non-law enforcement
officials.54 These data do not provide a complete picture of the extent of law
enforcement officers’ civil rights violations because law enforcement
complaints and investigations are not separated out from the others until the
category “Number of New Grand Juries” (40 law enforcement officers in fiscal
54. Were the information available regarding the number of complaints against and
investigations of law enforcement officers and the number of cases deferred to the states, a
determination would be permitted of the percentage of pleas, convictions and acquittals of law
enforcement officers compared to the number of complaints against and FBI investigations of law
enforcement officers. That comparison is impossible to make given the lack of data.
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year 2001). For this category and the remaining categories the number of law
enforcement and non-law enforcement cases can be studied and comparisons
can be drawn between these types of cases. Also listed are the total number of
cases filed against law enforcement officers (49 in fiscal year 2001), the
number of law enforcement officers prosecuted (97 in fiscal year 2001), the
number of law enforcement officers pleading guilty (42 in fiscal year 2001),
the number of convictions of law enforcement officers (14 in fiscal year 2001),
and the number of acquittals (13 in fiscal year 2001). The number of officers
who pled guilty or were convicted (56 in fiscal year 2001) was the highest total
in the past seventeen years. Of the cases going to trial, the conviction rate of
law enforcement officers was 52% in fiscal year 2001, compared to the 100%
conviction rate for all other categories of civil rights violations in that year.
The conviction rate and success rate are calculated differently, the former
involving only convictions and acquittals, and the latter including pleas as a
successful outcome.55 An overview of the seventeen-year period will develop
broad trends and will be followed by an examination of the Section’s activities
in the most recent five fiscal years (1997 to 2001).
The number of law enforcement defendants prosecuted by the Criminal
Section presents an irregular pattern between fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year
2001. Fifty-eight law enforcement defendants was the mean number of law
enforcement defendants per fiscal year, but there was significant variation
around this mean. The lowest number of law enforcement defendants was 22 in
fiscal year 1989, and the highest number was 97 defendants in fiscal year 2001.
During these seventeen fiscal years, the Criminal Section increased their
jurisdiction in two major areas. New prosecutions could be brought under the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 199456 and 18 U.S.C. § 247,57
which was substantially amended in 1996. Between fiscal years 1996 and
1997, when the amendments to the latter statute would have been applied,
there was a major shift in the number of law enforcement defendants
prosecuted by the Criminal Section—from 33 to 67 defendants. The 1997
level was retained through fiscal year 2000; at that point there was a one-third
increase in fiscal year 2001 when, as noted above, the number of defendants
reached 97, its highest number. The number of complaints varied considerably
55. I calculated the conviction rate as the number of convictions divided by the number of
convictions and acquittals. The Justice Department also uses the category of success rate, which
is the number of convictions and pleas divided by the number of convictions and pleas and
acquittals. As will be discussed below, pleas are one important part of the pattern of criminal
section outcomes.
56. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994; 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2000) (protecting against damage to religious property and free
exercise of religious beliefs, amended in 1996 to include prohibition of acts motivated by race,
ethnicity, or color).
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between fiscal year 1985 and fiscal year 1995, with a range from 7348 (fiscal
year 1987) to 9835 (fiscal year 1991). In this eleven-year period the average
number of complaints was 8437. The number of complaints had a substantial
change between fiscal years 1996 and 2001. The highest number of complaints
occurred between fiscal years 1998 and 2001, with an average of 12,291
complaints per year.
Table 1 reinforces the argument that the Criminal Section had greater
difficulty in obtaining a successful outcome, conviction or plea, in federal
prosecution of law enforcement officials than non-law enforcement
individuals. In each of the seventeen fiscal years, it had a higher success rate
for non-law enforcement individuals. Trials under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242
often have more than a single defendant, and this information is reflected in
Table 1.58 Once the Criminal Section brought a law enforcement case to trial,
there was substantial difficulty in obtaining a conviction. Between fiscal years
1985 and 2001, there were 254 convictions and 225 acquittals, an average of
15 convictions and 13 acquittals per year. Yearly, the number of law
enforcement convictions and all the acquittals had a wide variation. In seven
fiscal years, there were more acquittals than convictions in law enforcement
cases.59 In three other fiscal years, there were only one or two more
convictions than acquittals.60 In the seventeen fiscal years discussed herein,
law enforcement officials accounted for the vast majority of acquittals and in
some years all acquittals. The Criminal Section was consistently more
successful in non-law enforcement cases in obtaining convictions rather than
acquittals; in these cases there were 236 convictions and 35 acquittals. At trial,
the acquittal of a law enforcement official was a realistic possibility in contrast
to acquittals in non-law enforcement cases.
At the trial level, plea bargains represent the most frequent outcome in
both law enforcement and non-law enforcement cases. In many years the total
number of pleas in both categories is greater than the combined total of
convictions and acquittals; focus especially on fiscal years 1987 through 1992.
More pleas are found in non-law enforcement cases due to the larger number
of these cases than law enforcement cases. In the law enforcement category,
between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, this pattern of a greater number of pleas
occurred in four of the seven years; the main exception is law enforcement
officials in fiscal year 2000 when there were 25 convictions and 29 pleas, or
53% pleas. The highest ratio between pleas and convictions for non-law
58. For any given year, compare the total number of defendants with the total number of
cases.
59. See Table 1. There were more acquittals than convictions in fiscal years 1987, 1988,
1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1999.
60. See Table 1. There were only one or two more convictions than acquittals in fiscal years
1990, 1994, and 2001.
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enforcement officials was in fiscal year 2001, when there were 18 convictions
and 101 pleas, or 85% pleas. Recently, in fiscal years 2000 and 2001, there
have been a substantially greater percentage of pleas for non-law enforcement
cases than law enforcement cases.
Focus upon the most recent five-year time period (fiscal years 1997 to
2001) gives appropriate parameters to the scope of the Criminal Section’s path
to investigation and indictment of law enforcement officers. The 1997 to 2001
period demonstrates greater government activity than the previous five-year
time period in almost every dimension. During the same period, the Criminal
Section received 60,057 complaints and requested and reviewed 15,863 FBI
investigations. Matters about law enforcement officers were presented to 192
grand juries based upon prosecutors bringing 141 indictments and 48 criminal
informations. There were steady patterns of indictments during the last four
fiscal years with an average of 30 indictments per year. Criminal Section
attorneys brought 29 criminal informations during fiscal years 2000 and 2001,
and this number represents a marked increase from the total of 19 criminal
informations for the three previous years, fiscal years 1997 to 1999. In the past
five fiscal years, the Criminal Section filed 189 cases against law enforcement
officers. The outcome of Criminal Section prosecutions of law enforcement
officials in the last five fiscal years was 144 guilty pleas, 86 trials in which 73
defendants were convicted, and 58 acquittals.61 When considered over a fiveyear period, there are a limited number of cases moving from investigations,
grand jury indictments, or prosecutorial informations to trials.
The five-year period from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2001 shows a
rapid filtering from civil rights complaints received, to FBI investigations
conducted, to new federal grand juries convened. In Table 1A, two patterns
are shown: relationships between complaints received by the Criminal Section
and FBI investigations, and relationships between FBI investigations and new
grand juries concerning law enforcement officials. In these five fiscal years,
the FBI investigated an average of 26.4% of complaints filed with the Criminal
Section. Only 2.3% of the FBI investigations develop into grand juries, and
approximately one-half of the grand juries, or an average of 1.2% of FBI
investigations, concern law enforcement officials.62 Scholars should search for
and obtain additional information to clarify U.S. Department of Justice
prosecutorial activities about law enforcement officials.

61. In each jury trial, there can be one or more defendants. The Department of Justice did
not provide information on the range of the number of defendants in each trial.
62. Determination of Department of Justice and FBI criteria for which complaints merit an
FBI investigation requires analysis of their internal rules and memoranda.
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TABLE 1A63
SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL SECTION ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEARS
1997-2001

Fiscal Year

Complaints

1997

10891

1998

12192

1999

12132

2000

12404

2001

12438

TOTAL

60057

AVERAGE
FY ‘97-’01

12011

FBI
Investigations
(Inv./Comp.)
3321
(30.5%)
3802
(31.2%)
3664
(30.2%)
2835
(22.8%)
2241
(18.0%)
15863
(26.4%)
3172

New Grand
Juries: Total
(GJT/Inv.)

New Grand
Juries: LE
(GJLE/Inv.)

68
(2.0%)
78
(2.0%)
72
(2.0%)
76
(2.7%)
65
(2.9%)
359
(2.3%)
72

31
(1.0%)
37
(1.0%)
36
(1.0%)
48
(1.7%)
40
(1.8%)
192
(1.2%)
38

Once an FBI investigation is completed, the Criminal Section chooses
which cases to pursue and which to decline. Negotiations among attorneys
within the Criminal Section and between Criminal Section attorneys and the
FBI also affect these choices. Human Rights Watch obtained information on
the Criminal Section’s reasons for declining cases in fiscal year 1995, which
appears to be a representative year of the Criminal Section’s activities. Of the
2,830 declined cases, 497, or approximately 18%, were categorized as having a
“lack of evidence of criminal intent,” 482, or approximately 17%, as having
“no federal offense evident,” and 778, or approximately 27%, as having “weak
or insufficient admissible evidence.”64 The U.S. Department of Justice does
not provide data on or patterns concerning cases that are deferred to states for
prosecution. Jacobi proposes a new criminal law that supplements current
federal authority and would permit more active involvement by the

63. The data in this table is derived from SUMMARY, supra note 2.
64. Jacobi, supra note 39, at 810-11 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 32, at 38991).
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Department of Justice in combating police brutality.65 The main focus of the
new authority is serious police misconduct cases that go without state and local
prosecution because these officials failed to pursue the case, or pursued it halfheartedly, and the Criminal Section determined they could not prosecute
because the specific intent requirement was not present.66
Information about the number of FBI investigations concerning police
brutality and police misconduct has been difficult to obtain. Estimates for two
parts of the time period under investigation were found. First, in a 1991 U.S.
House Judiciary Hearing, William Baker, Assistant Director, Criminal
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, said: “In carrying out this
jurisdiction, the FBI places its highest priority on cases concerning police
brutality, which comprise 50 percent of the civil rights inquiries we initiate.”67
In the period immediately preceding this testimony, fiscal years 1985-91, the
approximate number of police brutality/police misconduct investigations
ranged from 1,490 (fiscal year 1985) to 1,790 (fiscal year 1991).68 There were
a declining number of investigations from fiscal year 1985 through fiscal year
1988, with a larger number of investigations from fiscal year 1989 to fiscal
year 1991. The average number of law enforcement convictions and pleas in
these seven fiscal years was 19 convictions and 20 pleas.
Second, the FBI’s Civil Rights Program website indicates a recently
increased emphasis on police misconduct issues between fiscal year 1997 and
fiscal year 2000: “The average number of all federal civil rights cases initiated
by the FBI from 1997-2000 was 3,513. Of those cases initiated, about 73%
were allegations of color of law violations, and about 82% of those allegations
concerned abuse of force with violence.”69 Since some of these cases are

65. Jacobi, supra note 39, at 811. The proposal is a new statute 18 U.S.C. § 242A which
would permit federal prosecution of law enforcement officers who commit serious misconduct
under color of state law, but only when local officials fail to act. The proposed statute only
requires officers to engage in intentional or reckless harm to individuals’ civil rights rather than
the higher standard of specific intent to deprive a victim of his civil rights.
66. Id.
67. Police Brutality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 7 (1991) (statement of William Baker, Assistant
Director, Criminal Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation). For another analysis of police
brutality, see JAMES H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE
EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE (1993).
68. Based on the substance of the testimony of Mr. Baker quoted above, see supra note 67
and accompanying text, these numbers are calculated as 50% of the total number of investigations
in the identified year, as shown in Table 1.
69. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COLOR OF LAW, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/
civilrights/color.htm.
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counted more than once, the police misconduct issues constitute 60%70 of the
total number of civil rights cases initiated in the period between fiscal year
1997 to fiscal year 2000.
The estimated number of FBI police
brutality/misconduct investigations for the four fiscal years 1997 to 2000
averages 2,564 investigations per year. In the same period, the average
number of cases filed against law enforcement personnel was 35 and the
average number of such defendants was 66. There was an average of 17.5
trials per year, with a high-water mark of 28 trials in fiscal year 2000. The
average number of convictions and pleas in these fiscal years was 14.75 and
25.5, respectively. The recent data reflects a lower average number of
convictions and a slightly higher number of pleas than in fiscal years 1985 to
1991. This data, again, reflects the small number of law enforcement
convictions and pleas when contrasted with the number of FBI investigations,
even while there is increased U.S. Department of Justice and FBI emphasis on
police misconduct.
Further exploration of the recent time period from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal
year 2001 indicates that the Criminal Section has increased its focus upon law
enforcement defendants when compared to all defendants. From fiscal years
1998-2001, there was a marked increase in the percentage of cases going to
trial concerning law enforcement defendants when compared to the previous
three fiscal years. There was a particular increase in fiscal years 2000 and
2001, and the last four fiscal years were at or above the mean percentage of
law enforcement defendants for the last seven fiscal years. In 2000 and 2001,
the Criminal Section increased the number of grand juries for law enforcement
officials to 88 grand juries, which represents a 20% increase from the 73 grand
juries in fiscal years 1998 and 1999.
TABLE 271
LAW ENFORCEMENT DEFENDANTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION,
FISCAL YEARS 1995-2001

Fiscal Year

1995
1996
1997

Total Number of
Defendants
(a)
138
128
189

Number of Law
Enforcement
Defendants
(b)
50
33
67

Percent
(b)/ (a) * 100
36.2
25.8
35.4

70. Eighty-two percent of seventy-three percent of the total number of investigations is equal
to sixty percent of that total.
71. The data in this table is derived from SUMMARY, supra note 2.
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1998
1999
2000
2001
TOTALS

153
138
122
191
1059

74
58
66
97
445
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48.3
42.0
54.1
50.7
42.0

V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section is
seriously concerned about problems of civil rights in American society, and
individual and law enforcement officials’ violation of individual’s civil rights.
The Section acts to deter abuse of law enforcement authority through a limited
number of carefully selected cases that establish parameters of acceptable
police conduct among federal and state law enforcement officials. The
Criminal Section and the FBI engage in a complex federalism relationship
when interacting with state and local officials concerning criminal prosecution
of police misconduct. The Criminal Section’s prosecution strategy is
deferential to state and local prosecutions of law enforcement misconduct.
The data analysis in this study examined Criminal Section prosecutions of
violation of individuals’ civil rights from fiscal year 1985 to fiscal year 2001.
In each year of the seventeen-year period, only a small percentage of
complaints presented to the Department and FBI investigations resulted in
grand jury presentments and trials. The analysis provided substantial evidence
that once the Criminal Section decided to prosecute a law enforcement officer,
the Criminal Section had substantial difficulty in obtaining a conviction. The
Criminal Section also had greater difficulty obtaining a successful
prosecutorial outcome, conviction or plea, for law enforcement officials than
non-law enforcement individuals.
The study demonstrated the importance of guilty pleas in resolving cases.
Pleas were the dominant outcome in cases that the Criminal Section
prosecuted. When law enforcement officials are convicted for federal civil
rights charges, federal prosecutors could develop strategies that enhance the
ability of state revocation officials, such as Peace Officer Standards and
Training Boards, to take action against state law enforcement officials. In
matters concerning law enforcement officials’ violation of an individual’s civil
rights which are not brought to trial, federal prosecutors could share
information with these state revocation officials. This information about police
misconduct can allow state revocation officials to follow due process
procedures which leads to removal or other penalties against a law
enforcement officer’s license. These interactions between federal and state
officials could enhance police accountability.
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Professor Roger Goldman’s article in this issue offers possibilities of
cooperation between federal officials and state officials, including Peace
Officer Standards and Training Boards, to achieve police accountability.
States play a significant role in redressing police misconduct. In law
enforcement accountability, states are not dependent upon the federal
government for fiscal or administrative assistance.72 In the last twenty years,
forty-four (44) states have created legislation or administrative rules that allow
decertification/revocation of law enforcement licenses for officer misconduct
and provide positive signals to the public about police integrity and
competence.73 States vary in the scope of law enforcement activities that are
subject to decertification/revocation, and there are varying degrees of
administrative
capabilities
and
authority
to
implement
decertification/revocation legislation. In almost all states with law enforcement
revocation authority, conviction of a felony will lead to permanent loss of
license; in addition, some states allow revocation for misdemeanor convictions.
In a recent article, Professor Goldman and I have discussed several states with
active police decertification programs.74
Can federal prosecutorial activities, successful or not, assist state practices
for law enforcement decertification programs?75 Possible cooperative linkages
between the federal Criminal Section and state decertification activities can
include new federal legislative and regulatory authority to the Criminal Section
officials to share investigative information about law enforcement misconduct
with state POST officials. Such new authority could ferret out law
enforcement misconduct and ensure such officers’ accountability and
overcome current barriers to cooperation between federal and state authorities.
Professor Goldman’s article pursues arguments concerning federal
prosecutors’ use of plea bargains to require state peace officers to temporarily
or permanently relinquish their law enforcement license as part of the
agreement.76

72. SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT 7
(2001).
73. Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Viable
Remedy for Police Misconduct, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541 (2000).
74. Id.
75. See Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law Enforcement Officers’ Licenses and
Federal Criminal Prosecution: An Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 22 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 121 (2003).
76. Id.
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